Using students' predicted and unpredicted delays in midterm preparation as measures of time-inconsistency and self-awareness, this paper shows that time-inconsistent behavior is associated with inferior class performance. Most students showed some time-inconsistency.
Introduction
Using the class behaviors and class performances of a group of undergraduates, I empirically examine three questions. The sample consists of students in my introductory macroeconomics class at the National University of Singapore (NUS). To measure class performance, I use scores in tutorial participation, midterm, and final examination. To identify time-inconsistency and self-awareness, I use survey responses to questions regarding their optimal, predicted, and actual study plans for the midterm examination. As the benchmark, the time-consistent students behave according to plan, and plan according to what is optimal from the long-run perspective. Thus, they predict and experience no delay in implementing their ideal study plan (i.e., ideal from the prior perspective).
Time-inconsistency, on the other hand, can take three forms. First, the naifs, who are completely unaware of their future time-inconsistency, predict no delay in initiating their study plan but end up deviating from it. Second, the sophisticates, who are fully aware of their future time-inconsistency, incorporate their time-inconsistency into their plan. In the absence of precommitment devices, they choose the best plan among those they will actually follow when the moment of action arrives, given their true self-control problems. This plan may not be the best plan from the long-run perspective if they can pre-commit themselves. Thus, the sophisticates predict deviations from their ideal study plan but experience no unpredicted delay in implementing their chosen plan. Finally, the partial naifs, who are aware of their future time-inconsistency but underestimate its severity, predict delay from the prior perspective but end up deviating further from their chosen plan. Thus, they show both predicted and unpredicted delays.
In summary, I use the students' predicted delay in initiating their own ideal study plan from the prior perspective as a measure of sophistication about future time-inconsistency, and unpredicted delay in implementing their chosen study plan as a measure of naiveté about future timeinconsistency. Predicted and unpredicted delays have negative effects on all measures of class performance. However, the negative effects of predicted delay on class performance turn out to be larger in size and more statistically significant than the effects of unpredicted delay. However, it is worth emphasizing that this finding does not imply that naiveté is less costly than sophistication because in addition to inferior class performance, naiveté has other costs, such as the disutility of "pulling an all-nighter." What this paper shows is that time-inconsistency has direct negative impacts on the quality of work, in addition to the utility cost of procrastination.
While unpredicted delay may also capture the effect of unexpected shocks, robustness checks reveal that predicted and unpredicted delays of an individual are significantly correlated with his empirical discount rates measured at different time-points, as hyperbolic discounting predicts. Under hyperbolic discounting, time-inconsistency arises from greater impatience (having higher discount rate) as the moment of action arrives, despite being more patient (having lower discount rate) when planning for the future. I measure the students' discount rates in two separate exer-cises involving monetary tradeoff at different time points. The evidence reveals that students who predicted longer delay were also those who exhibited higher future discount rate -the discount rate that weighs monetary tradeoff at two future time points. On the contrary, students who experienced longer unpredicted delay were those with higher current discount rate -the discount rate that weighs current versus future monetary tradeoff -holding constant their future discount rates.
Thus, the evidence is consistent with the interpretation that unpredicted delay arises because of failures to anticipate the higher discount rate that will govern behavior when the moment of action arrives.
This failure to anticipate preference reversal also shows up as prediction error in class performance, defined as the difference between the students' actual and predicted grade performance, where the prediction was made by the students themselves near the beginning of the semester.
This prediction error in class performance is significantly related to unpredicted delay, but not with predicted delay. Thus, the evidence shows that predicted delay measures self-awareness and this awareness has cross-domain validity -it is also reflected in the self-evaluation of future performance. This evidence is consistent with the interpretation that given full awareness of their future time-inconsistency and the absence of pre-commitment devices, the sophisticates correctly predict their deviations from optimal plans and they also correctly predict (and presumably accept) the consequence of their future time-inconsistency (in terms of inferior grade performance).
Finally, one may argue that predicted delay arises because the students mis-interpreted the question on the ideal date to start midterm preparation. Specifically, they may interpret the question as what they would do in an ideal world without constraints, despite the question's explicit highlight of the opportunity costs of studying. If this is true, then it could be that the students who predicted delay were those who were especially busy and wished to have started midterm preparation earlier. In this case, the negative correlation between predicted delay and class performance is due to the students' unusually busy schedules rather than their time-inconsistency. However, this would imply that the actual number of days spent studying should have a significant effect on class performance, even after controlling for predicted and unpredicted delays. There is no evidence for this.
Overall, the evidence suggests that predicted and unpredicted delays are good proxy measures of time-inconsistency and self-awareness. Time-inconsistency seems to be a better approximation to actual behavior and it affects outcomes significantly.
Methodology and Results

The Related Literature
Economists generally assume that people have time-consistent preferences: a person's relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date remains unchanged no matter when he is asked. Strotz (1956) shows that the only discount function that gives time-consistent preferences is the exponential discount function, in which the discount rate is constant over time. While there can be time-inconsistency due to either present-bias or future-bias, the existing literature typically models time-inconsistency as present-biased preferences: when considering tradeoffs between two future moments, stronger relative weight is given to the earlier moment as it gets closer (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 2004), on the other hand, argue that present-bias is no more prevalent than is future-bias, measured by the tendency to consume less (instead of more) now than would be ideal. Akerlof (1991) attributes present-bias to saliency of immediate cost and its effect on decision. The existing literature typically models present-biased preferences using hyperbolic or quasihyperbolic discounting, in which the discount rate declines over time (for example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Laibson (1997) (2002)). Thus, the evidence is consistent with people being to some degree aware, but not completely aware, of future time-inconsistency.
However, only people who are at least partially aware of their future time-inconsistency would pre-commit themselves to smaller choice set. Thus, evidence on the use of pre-commitment devices cannot distinguish the time-consistent from the naifs because both will not choose to precommit themselves: the time-consistent cannot benefit from pre-commitment to a smaller choice set, whereas the naifs, believing that they will be well-behaved in the future, do not think they need pre-commitment. Evidence on the use of pre-commitment devices alone also cannot distinguish the partial naifs from the sophisticates because both will choose to pre-commit themselves. This paper attempts to fill this gap by proposing a methodology that separately identifies all four types -the time-consistent, the naifs, the partial naifs, and the sophisticates. not actual behavior, they cannot distinguish between the time-consistent and the naifs because both will predict ideal behavior. They also cannot distinguish between the partial naifs and the sophisticates because both will predict deviations from ideal behavior.
The Surveys This paper considers the task of midterm preparation, a familiar task for the undergraduates.
The participants are undergraduates in my introductory macroeconomics class at the National University of Singapore (NUS). I announced the midterm examination date early in the semester. In a questionnaire distributed in class, I then asked the students to indicate: (i) the optimal date they would start preparing for the midterm, taking into account both the costs and the benefits; (ii) the predicted date they thought they would actually start preparing for the midterm. On the day of the midterm, I asked the students to indicate the actual date they started their midterm preparation. 4 I also asked the students to convert the dates into number of days before midterm because this may be a more natural way of thinking about study plans.
The Identification Strategy
Based on these responses, I create two variables to measure a student's time-inconsistency and self-awareness. First, predicted delay is defined as the difference between optimal and predicted dates. 5 Predicted delay measures the degree to which a person is aware of his future timeinconsistency because a person will only predict deviation from his optimal plan when asked in advance if he is aware of his future time-inconsistency. Both the time-consistent and the naifs will predict no delay. 6 Second, unpredicted delay is defined as the difference between predicted and actual dates. 7 In 4 See the appendix for exact questions in the surveys. 5 E.g., if his optimal date is November 10 but his predicted date is November 11, then predicted delay is equal to +1 day. 6 Rabin and O'Donoghue (1999) show that even for an onerous task, a sophisticate can do it either too early or too late from the long-run perspective. Specifically, a sophisticate can start too early to avoid doing it too late given certain cost structure of completing the onerous task. In other words, even assuming present bias, predicted delay can be negative or positive.
7 E.g., if the predicted date is November 11 but actual date is November 13, then unpredicted delay is equal to +2 days. These definitions do not rule out negative values for predicted and unpredicted delays. E.g., if unpredicted delay equals -2, it means that the person actually starts midterm preparation two days before planned.
the world with no uncertainty, unpredicted delay measures the degree to which a person underestimates his true time-inconsistency and plans too optimistically. Both the time-consistent and the sophisticates will experience no unpredicted delay. However, with uncertainty, unexpected delay may also capture the effect of random shocks that force a student to deviate from his study plan.
Nevertheless, robustness check later shows that consistent with hyperbolic discounting, predicted and unpredicted delays are significantly correlated with the empirical discount rates at different time-points and so unpredicted delay does seem to be a good proxy for a person's naiveté about his future time-inconsistency. This identification strategy has three advantages. First, it takes the theory of hyperbolic discounting seriously and the identification strategy follows directly from theory. Second, it makes no assumption about the nature of the task -whether studying for midterm is considered onerous or enjoyable. Third, it makes no assumption about the direction of the bias and so it does not rule out future-biased preferences.
The Results
Out of 158 students in the sample, this strategy identifies 11 time-consistent persons (7% of total), 31 naifs (19.6%), 96 partial naifs (60.8%), and 20 sophisticates (12.7%). Thus, a great majority of the students exhibited some form of time-inconsistency and most seemed only partially aware of their time-inconsistency. Table 2 reports the baseline regression. The independent variables include predicted delay, unpredicted delay, and a number of control variables for personal characteristics. The dependent variables are various measures of the students' performance in class, including their performance in tutorials, midterm, and final examination. Tutorials were based on continuous assessment. The students were evaluated based on both attendance and participation in discussion. Tutorial performance accounted for 10 percent of the final grade. Midterm examination consisted of multiple choice questions that were relatively straightforward. It accounted for 30 percent of the final grade.
Final examination was a closed-book written examination that included both analytical and numerical questions with different difficulty levels. It accounted for 60 percent of the final grade. I used anonymous grading for both midterm and final examinations.
By using class performances measured at different time points during the semester, I assume that a person's time-inconsistency and self-awareness are relatively stable and persistent, at least over a three-month period. Mischel et al. (1992) show that the ability to resist temptation is a very long lasting personality trait with significant cross domain validity. They find that the ability of four-year-old children to delay immediate gratification is significantly and positively related to both their propensity for self-control and their SAT scores when they reach adolescence.
The estimates in Table 2 suggest that predicted delay was associated with lower class performance for all performance measures. The effects are always statistically significant at the 1% level.
The sophisticates, who were fully aware of his future time-inconsistency, still under-performed relative to the time-consistent although the delay was perfectly anticipated. This is expected if the sophisticates could not pre-commit to the optimal plan from the long-run perspective. In this case, the sophisticates would do what Pollak (1968) refers to as "consistent planning" -they would choose the best plan among those they would actually follow given their self-control problem.
On the other hand, unpredicted delay also affected class performance negatively although the effects are, somewhat surprisingly, smaller in magnitude. Furthermore, only the effect on final examination is statistically significant at the 5% level. 8 This finding that unpredicted delay has a smaller and less statistically significant effect on class performance than predicted delay appears to contradict theoretical predictions. Theoretically, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) argue that naiveté is especially costly for a task involving immediate cost because naifs with self-control problem may procrastinate repeatedly and do the task at a time when it is especially costly to do (in terms of disutility cost). In contrast, because the sophisticates fully incorporate future tendency to procrastinate into their plan, their decision to procrastinate is a one-shot delay taking into account future costs and benefits. Thus, theory predicts that naiveté is costlier than sophistication.
To reconcile the apparent contradiction, it is worth noting that being naive imposes other costs, in addition to lower class performance. For example, Akerlof (1991) suggests that salience of immediate cost may cause the naifs to procrastinate and "pull an all-nighter" to get the task done. 9 However, studying more intensely right before a test, after much procrastination, would almost surely increase the utility cost of studying, because of diminishing returns and stress. Thus, what this paper shows is that time-inconsistency has direct negative impacts on the quality of work, in addition to the utility cost modeled by O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
Gender and the number of semesters a student had spent in the university have no significant effect on class performance. Not surprisingly, exchange students performed significantly worse than regular students by all measures of class performance because they were evaluated on pass/fail basis only and they were also less familiar with the examination system in the host university.
Economics majors generally performed worse than non-economics majors. While this module is compulsory for economics majors, it is an elective for non-economics majors. Thus, self-selection implies that non-economics majors who choose to take it should be especially motivated. Moreover, because non-economics majors consist of students from engineering and hard sciences, they also tend to be more comfortable with mathematics.
These differences in class performance were reflected in the final grade. Using final grade as the dependent variable, Table 3 re-estimates the regressions using ordered logit and probit models.
The conclusions remain unchanged. In the baseline logit regression in column (1) 
Robustness Checks
How robust are these findings? Do predicted and unpredicted delays really identify time-inconsistency and self-awareness? Are these measures related to the empirical discount rates weighing the same tradeoff at different time-points, as the theory of hyperbolic discounting predicts? Let's define the current discount rate as the discount rate that weighs utility now versus utility in the future, and the future discount rate as the discount rate that weighs utility in the future versus utility in a more distant future.
Under hyperbolic discounting, a naive procrastinator believes that he has a low future discount rate, i.e., he believes that he will be patient in the future. However, he experiences preference reversal when the future arrives because by then, his behavior is governed by his current discount rate, which is higher than his perceived future discount rate, i.e., he acts more impatiently. Thus, the more naive a person is, the higher his current discount rate is compared to his perceived future discount rate. I identify a person as more naive the longer his unpredicted delay is. Thus, unpredicted delay should be positively correlated with the current discount rate, holding constant the perceived future discount rate. On the contrary, a sophisticated procrastinator correctly perceives his future time-inconsistency. I identify sophisticated time-inconsistent behavior with predicted delay. So predicted delay should be positively correlated with the perceived future discount rate, holding constant the current discount rate.
To check these predictions, I ran two surveys one week apart during lecture near the end of the semester. 10 The first survey elicited the amount $X that would make the students indifferent between having $10 immediately and $X one week later. A student's annualized current discount rate can be calculated as 
× ln(Y /10).
I first calculate the pairwise correlation coefficients between current discount rate, future dis- 10 See the appendix for the detailed instructions given. count rate, predicted delay, and unpredicted delay. Four correlations have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the five percent level.
First, current discount rate and future discount rate are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.51: a person who is relatively impatient weighing tradeoff between now and the future is likely to be also relatively impatient if the same tradeoff is shifted to the future. The discount rates show some stability over time.
Second, predicted and unpredicted delays are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of -0.32: more awareness of future time-inconsistency is associated with less naiveté in predicting future behavior. Sophistication and naiveté are inversely related.
Third, future discount rate and predicted delay are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.23: a person who thinks more impatiently about two future tradeoffs is more likely to predict longer future delay. This correlation suggests that predicted future delay reflects future time discounting.
Fourth, current discount rate and unpredicted delay are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.20: a person who is more impatient as the moment of action arrives tends to be too optimistic in his ability to carry out his plan (i.e., he tends to under-predict future delay). When the moment of action arrives, a person's current discount rate governs his actual behaviors. This correlation is consistent with the interpretation that preference reversal or unpredicted delay are due to naiveté or failure to anticipate impatience when the moment of action arrives. Table 4 regresses predicted and unpredicted delays on current and future discount rates and shows that partial correlations yield the same conclusions. Taken together, these correlations are consistent with the hyperbolic discounting theory of time-inconsistency: preference reversal arises from naiveté about future impatience. 11 Nevertheless, longer delays may be associated with shorter preparation time, which hurts class performance directly for reasons unrelated to time-inconsistency and self-awareness. For example, the students might have mis-interpreted the question on the optimal or the ideal date as what they would do in an ideal world with no constraints, despite the question's explicit emphasis on the opportunity costs of their choice. If this were true, then students who were especially busy and wished to have been able to start the preparation earlier would report longer predicted delay.
To check for this possible omitted variable bias, Table 5 re-estimates the regressions, including actual days of preparation as additional control. To account for possible non-linearity due to diminishing returns, the regressions also include a quadratic term. It turns out that both qualitative and quantitative conclusions are unaffected. Furthermore, once predicted and unpredicted delays are controlled for, actual number of days spent in preparation has basically no effect on class performance. For example, one more day of preparation is associated with only 0.04 point improvement in the midterm score while the estimated effects of predicted and unpredicted delays are basically unaffected. Table 3 shows that the same is true with final grade as the dependent variable.
According to the theory of present-biased preferences, the sophisticates procrastinate taking into account the costs and benefits of procrastination, as well as their true tendency to procrastinate in the future. Thus if predicted delay measures awareness of future self-control problem, as this paper claims, then predicted delay should also be fully incorporated into the students' own predic-tion of their future class performance. To check this prediction, I asked the students to predict their final grade for this module early in the semester. I define prediction error of grade performance as the difference between actual grade and predicted grade (measured in grade points). I then regress this prediction error on the same set of independent variables using ordered logit and ordered probit models. Table 6 reports the results.
It turns out that predicted delay has no significant effect on prediction error, implying that the effect of anticipated delay is fully incorporated into self-evaluation of future grade performance.
In contrast, unpredicted delay is negatively correlated with prediction error and the effect is statistically significant at the five percent level in the ordered logit regressions. In other words, naiveté about future time-inconsistency is associated with overconfidence in class performance. These results suggest that self-awareness of future time-inconsistency is consistent with self-evaluation of future performance.
Male students and exchange students tend to be overconfident too: they are overly optimistic about their grade performance. The finding of male overconfidence is consistent with the behavioral finance literature (see, for example, Barber and Odean(2001) ). On the other hand, the exchange students may be overconfident because they are unfamiliar with the grading system in their host university or because they fail to anticipate their self-control problem while studying abroad. Interestingly, while there is some evidence that economics majors under-performed relative to non-economics majors, this under-performance is perfectly anticipated: the economics majors did not show significant prediction error. So he chooses the best plan among those that he will actually follow and he acts according to plan.
A partially naive time-inconsistent person chooses the best plan among those he believes he will follow but he fails to act according to plan because his belief about his future behavior is partially wrong.
Using survey responses on the optimal, predicted, and actual dates of midterm preparation, I create two variables -predicted and unpredicted delays in initiating midterm preparation -and use them as proxy measures of time-inconsistency and self-awareness. The existing literature has contributed important and interesting evidence supporting time-inconsistency, particularly the findings that people use pre-commitment devices to constrain their future choices and the findings that people's predicted intertemporal allocation deviates from the allocation they view as optimal. However, this evidence has lower power in distinguishing the time-consistent from the naifs, and the partial naifs from the sophisticates. This paper attempts to fill this gap. By exploiting differences in predicted and unpredicted delays among the time-consistent, the naifs, the partial naifs, and the sophisticates, this paper attempts to distinguish all types of time-inconsistency and self-awareness.
Overall, the evidence suggests that time-inconsistency is prevalent and it matters. I find that most students behaved time-inconsistently and they were at least partially aware of their timeinconsistency. Time-inconsistent behavior is associated with inferior class performances. The students who predict longer delay are those with higher future discount rates -the discount rate that weighs two future tradeoffs from today's perspective. Furthermore, the students who experience longer unpredicted delay are those with higher current discount rate -the discount rate that weighs now against the future. Thus, the findings are consistent with the theory of hyperbolic discounting, in which time-inconsistency or preference reversal arise from greater impatience (having higher discount rate) as the moment of action arrives, despite being more patient (having lower discount rate) when planning for the future.
It turns out that once I control for predicted and unpredicted delays, actual number of days spent in preparation has no significant effects on class performances. This evidence suggests that predicted delay reflects self-awareness of time-inconsistency rather than mis-interpretation of the optimal date as when a person would start preparation in an ideal world without constraints. Furthermore, predicted delay is fully incorporated into the students' self-evaluation of future grade performance, while unpredicted delay is associated with overconfidence in future performance.
This evidence suggests that self-awareness -as measured by predicted delay -has some crossdomain validity. Interestingly, male students and exchange students also tend to be overconfident in their future class performance. Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Prediction Error = Actual Grade Point -Predicted Grade Point 
Appendix -The Surveys
There were four separate surveys altogether. I ran all surveys in class by distributing written questionnaires. I ran the first survey early in the semester. The survey asked the following questions:
1. Preparing for midterm involves forgoing some activities you enjoy, such as watching TV, playing basketball, and shopping but it may improve your grade performance. If you take both the costs and benefits into consideration, what is the optimal or ideal date for you to start preparing for the Midterm? Write down a specific date and the number of days before the midterm (e.g., 4 October 2004 is one day before the midterm). I ran the second survey immediately before the midterm examination. Here's the question:
What is the actual date you started preparing for the Midterm? Write down a specific date and the number of days before the midterm (e.g., 4 October 2004 is one day before the midterm).
I ran the third and fourth surveys later in the semester to estimate the current and future discount rates. In the third survey, I gave the students the following instructions and used the responses to estimate their current discount rates:
For each of the choices below (rows [a] to [j]) circle the item that you most prefer. You should circle one item in EVERY row. You should assume that the item that you circle will be delivered to you on the associated date. For example, "$10 now," means I will give you $10 in class today.
After we collect these forms, we will randomly select one student. For that student, we will randomly select one row (from rows [a] to [j] ) and pay that student what he/she chose in that randomly selected row. For example, imagine that we randomly select you and that we randomly select row j, Assume that you circled "$10 now" in row j. Then I will pay you $10 in class today. In the following week, I ran the fourth survey. I gave the students the following instructions and used the responses to estimate their future discount rates:
For each of the choices below (rows [a] to [j]) circle the item that you most prefer. You should circle one item in EVERY row. You should assume that the item that you circle will be delivered to you on the associated date. For example, "$10 next Tuesday," means I will give you $10 next Tuesday. Today is Nov 9. Note: There is a seven-day delay between now and next Tuesday. There is yet another seven-day delay between next Tuesday and Nov 23.
